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INTRODUCTION  
In this paper, I will explore some themes of Owen Fiss´s scholarly work in order to shed 
light on an increasingly important legal institution: arbitration. Fiss has written extensively about 
courts, democracy and the rule of law. Although he has paid less attention to arbitration, his general 
ideas can be applied to it in interesting ways. So what I invite you to do here is to walk through 
the arbitration field with his guidance.  
Before we get into that, however, I need to say a few introductory words about different 
types of arbitration, to better frame the discussion that will follow. 
 
THE VARIETIES OF ARBITRAL EXPERIENCE 
Arbitration is a key institution in our legal world. Private parties often choose to resolve 
their disputes through arbitrators, instead of using regular courts. The most salient feature of 
arbitration is that it is based on consent. The parties usually express their consent to arbitrate before 
the controversy arises. It is also possible, though less common, for parties to agree to arbitrate after 
the dispute has erupted. Courts, in contrast, exercise a “governmental power” over litigants. When 
a plaintiff brings a suit to the competent court, the consent of the defendant is irrelevant to establish 




A second feature to highlight is that arbitrators are chosen and paid by the parties, whereas 
courts are permanent institutions set up and run by the state. The procedures are also different. 
Parties are empowered to design or choose the procedures that arbitrators will employ, whereas 
the same measure of flexibility is not offered to them when it comes to courts.  
  There are several reasons why parties may prefer arbitration over adjudication. There is, 
first, the advantage of specialization. When parties resort to arbitration, they can choose experts in 
particular fields to resolve their disputes. When they go to court, in contrast, the judges they 
encounter have a more generalist legal training. A second advantage is related to speed: by means 
of the arbitral procedure, the parties don´t have to wait in line for their case to be decided by the 
competent court. The arbitrators they appoint can focus on it soon (unless they are very busy). The 
arbitral award, moreover, is usually final: the grounds upon which courts are authorized to vacate 
an award tend to be extremely limited.  
These advantages apply to arbitration generally. When arbitration is “international”, 
moreover, it exhibits some additional strengths.1  If the parties to a contract are nationals of 
different states, for example, each is reluctant to submit potential disputes to the domestic courts 
of the other party´s country. Arbitration quickly enters the picture, for it provides a neutral forum 
for the resolution of controversies. (As we will see later, this feature raises deep issues about the 
meaning and possibilities of impartiality in our world). Another advantage that arbitration brings 
to the table derives from the existence of an important international instrument that helps ensure 
that courts in different countries will comply with the arbitral agreements and will enforce the 
awards: the New York Convention of 1958. 
                                                          
1 One of the most comprehensive treatments of this type of arbitration is Gary Born, International 




There is a specific modality of arbitration that deserves separate treatment, for it has raised 
considerable controversy: “investor-state arbitration”. When a foreign company or individual 
makes an investment in a country, the risk exists that the local authorities will exercise their 
governmental powers in ways that unduly reduce or eliminate the value of the investment. A 
response to this problem has been found in public international law, both at the substantive level 
and at the procedural level.2 
From a substantive perspective, international law has developed some customs that protect 
foreign investors. States, for example, are under the duty to provide foreigners with full protection 
and security, must accord them fair and equitable treatment, and cannot take their property without 
paying adequate compensation. In addition to customary law, states have entered into international 
treaties of various kinds, to further specify and sometimes extend these principles. Two states, for 
example, may subscribe a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) that grants citizens and companies that 
are nationals of those states a collection of rights as foreign investors. Or two states may agree 
upon a broader treaty on free trade that includes a chapter on investments. The international 
instruments may also be multilateral (as is the case with NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and the Energy 
Charter, for example).    
From a procedural perspective, public international law helps investors through the creation 
of a forum where their disputes with host governments can be resolved: investment arbitration. To 
a large extent, what has pushed developments in this direction is distrust of local courts. In this 
field, distrust of the local judiciary does not merely come from the fact that one of the parties to 
the dispute (the investor) is a foreigner. It also derives from the fact that the other party is the 
                                                          
2 For an overview, see Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 




government (not a private party). The fear is that the government will press the domestic courts to 
rule in its favor. Because the private and public interests at stake in these controversies are usually 
very large, the risk of bias is especially pronounced.  
There are different arbitration forums where investment controversies may be brought. 
Chief among these is ICSID (the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes), 
which was created by the Washington Convention of 1966, under the auspices of the World Bank.3 
This arbitration house is open to states that have ratified the ICSID Convention. An investor can 
bring a complaint against a state before the arbitral bodies that are set up under the ICSID 
framework. A state can also bring a claim against an investor, but this is extremely rare in practice.  
For a state to be brought to an ICSID arbitration tribunal, it is necessary, of course, to obtain 
the agreement of both parties to the dispute. The investor can easily consent by filing a request for 
arbitration. The state´s consent, in turn, is normally expressed before the dispute arises. 
Sometimes, the contract between the government and the investor includes the pertinent arbitration 
clause. Other times, the national law (whether a statute or the Constitution) provides that the state 
agrees to arbitrate particular classes of disputes with foreign investors. Most frequently, however, 
consent on the part of the state is to be found in an international treaty (a BIT, for example) that 
the state has signed with the other state (the home state) the investor comes from.  
What makes ICSID arbitration remarkable is that the award issued by the arbitrators can 
only be reviewed by a committee within ICSID. No national court is authorized to check the 
validity of the award. National courts, moreover, cannot refuse to enforce it –the New York 
                                                          
3 On the origins of ICSID, see Antonio R. Parra, The History of ICSID (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). For a detailed analysis of the ICSID Convention, see Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention. A 




Convention of 1958, which enumerates some grounds for denying enforcement under national law, 
does not apply here. The reason is that the ICSID arbitral process is not seated in any domestic 
legal system, but is instead anchored in the self-contained sphere of public international law. The 
decision it generates is thus immune from national checks.4   
   ICSID arbitration is an important instance of the gradual empowerment of private actors 
under public international law. In the domain of human rights, we have witnessed the emergence 
of legal regimes that entitle private individuals to sue a state before an international tribunal. The 
European Court of Human Rights is the most prominent example in this regard. Similarly, the 
ICSID Convention has opened a forum where private actors, in their capacity as foreign investors, 
can bring a claim against a state. The international tribunal in this area, however, is of an arbitral 
nature.      
With all this background information in mind, let us now turn to Owen Fiss´s theory of 
adjudication.   
 
ADJUDICATION, ARBITRATION AND SETTLEMENT, IN OWEN FISS´S WORK 
The legal landscape of any modern state includes three institutions: adjudication, 
arbitration and settlement. How should we understand them? What is distinctive of each, and what 
are the links between them? According to Owen Fiss, it is a mistake to view these institutions as 
different mechanisms to achieve the same goal –the resolution of disputes. For Fiss, each performs 
                                                          
4 If only the host state or the home state, but not both, is a party to ICSID, there is then the possibility of 
using the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, which are of a different nature. The arbitration process is then located 
within a domestic legal system. The courts of the seat that has been chosen get the authority to review the award, in 
light of national arbitration laws. The enforcement of the award, moreover, can be denied by local courts, on the 




a radically different function. There is, moreover, a certain normative hierarchy among them. Fiss 
stresses the importance of adjudication in a political community that strives for justice. Although 
he is not really “against” arbitration or settlement, he wants to secure for adjudication a central 
place in society, in order to realize the values that the law incorporates. 
“Adjudication”, Fiss writes, “is the social process that enables judges to give meaning to 
public values”. 5  The public values Fiss refers to are those expressed in legislative and 
constitutional texts, as well as those that judges develop through the common law. Although judges 
are fallible, they have institutional incentives to interpret and develop the law in the right direction. 
There are various features of the adjudicative process that push them to be “objective”, to seek the 
“true meaning” of public values. Fiss insists on two features: the judiciary´s obligation to 
participate in a dialogue of a particular kind, and its independence. As to dialogue, Fiss writes: 
“Judges are entitled to exercise power only after they have participated in a dialogue about 
the meaning of the public values. It is a dialogue with very special qualities: (1) judges are not in 
control of their agenda but are compelled to confront grievances or claims they would otherwise 
prefer to ignore; (2) judges do not have full control over whom they must listen to; they are bound 
by rules requiring them to listen to a broad range of persons or spokespersons; (3) judges are 
compelled to speak back, to respond to the grievance or the claim, and to assume individual 
responsibility for the response; and (4) judges must also justify their decisions”.6     
This last point –the need to justify decisions- is particularly important. Judges must offer 
reasons to support their judgments, and those reasons must transcend “transient beliefs”. The 
                                                          
5 Owen Fiss, “The Forms of Justice”, in Owen Fiss, The Law As It Could Be (New York: New York 
University Press, 2003), p. 3. 




values that judges announce and develop in their opinions are to endure long enough for public 
morality to acquire “inner coherence”.7   
The second institutional property that Fiss emphasizes is judicial independence. He 
distinguishes three different forms of judicial independence.8 The first is “party detachment”, 
which refers to the extent to which judges are independent from the parties to the controversy. The 
second form is “individual autonomy”, which concerns the power of one judge over another. The 
third is “political insularity”, which means independence from political institutions and the public 
in general.  
According to Fiss, the right degree of judicial independence varies along these three 
dimensions. Independence as party detachment is uncompromising in its demands. “The more 
detachment from the parties the better”, he writes.9  The second dimension, in contrast, is more 
nuanced. There is no threat to judicial independence if lower judges are controlled by higher courts 
through regular appellate procedures, or if they are constrained by precedents laid down by earlier 
courts (as is the case in common law jurisdictions, for example). Bureaucratic modalities of 
control, in contrast, exercised by judges acting in their administrative or disciplinary capacities, 
are more troublesome. Finally, independence understood as political insularity poses the greatest 
challenge, since political insularity is necessary, but too much of it may be a bad thing. Fiss 
explains: 
“We want to insulate the judiciary from the more popularly controlled institutions, but at 
the same time recognize that some elements of political control should remain. We must 
                                                          
7 Ibid., p.12. 
8 “The Right Degree of Independence”, in Owen Fiss, The Dictates of Justice. Essays on Law and Human 
Rights (Dordrecht, Republic of Letters, 2011), pp. 13-29.  




accommodate two values –not just judicial legitimacy, but popular sovereignty as well- and this 
requires us to optimize, rather than to maximize, this form of independence. In contrast to party 
detachment, it is simply not true that in a democracy the more political insularity the better. What 
we need is the right degree of insularity”.10  
Fiss enumerates some of the ways in which judges in the United States are subject to 
political control: the political branches have a say in the appointment process; they exercise power 
over judicial finances; they can reverse judicial rulings through legislative or constitutional 
amendments; and they can create obstacles to the enforcement of judicial decisions.  
In sum, Fiss expects judges to do a good job of interpreting the values that the political 
community commits itself to. This expectation is based on the type of dialogue judges participate 
in, and on the measure of institutional independence they enjoy, which is compatible with the 
existence of democratic checks on their performance.  
On the basis of this theory, Fiss goes on to argue that it is wrong to understand the judicial 
function as that of resolving disputes. “Dispute resolution may be one consequence of the judicial 
decision”, he explains, but the role of the judge is “to give the proper meaning to our public 
values”. The judge does this “by enforcing and thus safeguarding the integrity of the existing public 
norms or by supplying new norms”.11 
Actually, Fiss contends that dispute resolution is such a marginal aspect of adjudication 
that it is an “extravagant use of public resources” for judges to hear cases that do not “threaten or 
otherwise implicate a public value”, as when disputes are confined to the interpretation of the 
                                                          
10 Ibid., p. 20. 




words of a contract, for example. It is in this context that arbitration enters the picture. Fiss 
maintains that “it seems quite appropriate for those disputes to be handled not by courts but by 
arbitrators”.12 Here is how he contrasts arbitration and adjudication: 
“Arbitration is like adjudication in that it, too, seeks the right, the just, and the true 
judgment. There is, however, an important difference in the two processes arising from the nature 
of the decisional agency –one private, the other public. Arbitrators are paid by the parties, chosen 
by the parties, and enjoined by a set of practices (such as a reluctance to write opinions or generate 
precedents) that localizes or privatizes the decision. The function of the arbitrator is to resolve a 
dispute. The function of the judge, on the other hand, must be understood in wholly different terms: 
The judge is a public officer, paid for by public funds, chosen not by the parties but by the public 
or its representatives, and empowered by the political agencies to enforce and create society-wide 
norms”.13  
In his discussion on arbitration, Fiss cites an article by William Landes and Richard Posner, 
which distinguishes two types of services that the court system provides: dispute resolution and 
rule formulation. 14 Landes and Posner argue that a private market can supply the first service, but 
not the second. Public intervention is necessary to produce rules, since private arbitrators do not 
have the right incentives to do so. The argument, in a nutshell, is that arbitrators are paid by the 
parties to decide a given case, not to think deeply about the rule that should apply generally. 
Actually, arbitrators may fear that a very clear holding will make them less likely to be hired as 
arbitrators in later disputes, if such a holding disfavors a class of people that may be potential 
                                                          
12 Ibid., p. 26. 
13 Ibid., p. 26. 





clients. Even if the rules arbitrators formulated were “balanced” ones, their effect would be to 
reduce future litigation. But arbitrators are not particularly interested in that: they want more, not 
less, arbitration business. So we cannot expect arbitrators to give us much in terms of precedents, 
which are technically “public goods”. (A precedent creates positive externalities for people who 
have contributed nothing to the process through which the precedent has been generated). 
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Owen Fiss is critical of Lon Fuller´s theory 
of adjudication, which is based on the axiom of individual participation: the affected party is given 
the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments in court for a decision in his favor. Fiss 
argues that one of the implications of Fuller´s individualist conception, if taken seriously, is that it 
would be unacceptable for courts to generate public norms through judicial precedents. A 
precedent, after all, binds future parties that have not been heard by the court that establishes the 
precedent. For it to be legitimate, adjudication would have to be reduced to a form of arbitration. 
Fiss comments: “It is no mere happenstance that Fuller spent a great deal of his professional life 
as an arbitrator”.15  
Arbitration, finally, needs to be distinguished from settlement. In his influential article, 
“Against Settlement”, Fiss argues that society pays a price when settlements are reached: parties 
may well settle “while leaving justice undone”. 16  This departure from justice is often a 
consequence of the unequal bargaining power of the parties, due to disparities of resources. A 
settlement can strongly deviate from the decision that judges would have adopted. 
                                                          
15 “The Forms of justice”, op. cit., p. 36. Of course, Fuller accepted that the production and evolution of 
norms is part of the judicial task. It would be wrong to read him to endorse the thesis that the only function of courts 
is to settle disputes. For a convincing reconstruction of Fuller´s conception, see Robert G. Bone, “Lon Fuller´s 
Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of 
Litigation”, 75 Boston University Law Review, 1273 (1995).     




So, in Owen Fiss´s legal world, there is a difference between arbitration and settlement: the 
former is geared to the correct interpretation and application of the law, while the latter is not. But 
there is a common characteristic that unites them: in both cases no set of public norms (no case 
law) is created –only the specific disputes are resolved.   
In what follows, I want to examine some questions concerning arbitration in light of Owen 
Fiss´s general theory. In particular, I want to focus on the connection between arbitration, the 
construction of a system of precedents, and the democratic checks that the political branches 
should be authorized to exercise. For these purposes, it is crucial to draw a distinction between 
private law arbitration (whether domestic or international) and investment arbitration.  
    
ARBITRATION, PRECEDENTS, AND DEMOCRATIC CHECKS IN THE SPHERE OF 
PRIVATE LAW   
 
It is quite uncontroversial that for a well-functioning system of precedents to emerge from 
a collection of decisions, several conditions need to be satisfied: a) the decisions must be expressed 
in written, reasoned opinions; b) they must be published; and c) there must be a central body with 
the capacity to harmonize the discordant interpretations of the various decision-makers. Are these 
conditions met by the arbitral process?   
With respect to the first condition, it is important to observe that things have evolved 
significantly. For a long while, many arbitral awards were “naked” –no reasons were given by the 
arbitrators. This may have been regarded as an advantage: in cases where the reasons for and 
against the legal positions advanced by the parties seemed to lead to a tie, arbitrators could easily 




recognize its own limitations. We should be aware that we have an addiction to reason that needs 
to be held in check. When the costs of looking for further reasons clearly exceed the benefits, the 
most rational course of action is to “resist the sirens of reason”.17 Arbitration may have been 
regarded as a space that is friendly to this type of rationality.  
The tendency in most jurisdictions, however, is for arbitral awards to figure in written 
opinions that provide reasons. (The law in many places actually requires reasoned awards). The 
United States has joined this general trend in international commercial arbitration, though naked 
awards are still very common in the purely domestic sphere. Alan Rau makes the interesting point 
that the American preference for naked awards in domestic arbitration is to be explained by the 
fact that American lawyers are rather skeptic about the capacity of reasons to constrain judges. 
They are more skeptic than their European counterparts, he argues. American legal education “has 
so carefully honed the skills of deconstructing judicial opinions, and so laboriously trained us 
[Americans] to debunk their explanatory power, that we can no longer believe in the presence of 
such opinions as an indispensable element of a just decision”.18 This, of course, is an unsettling 
point for anyone working in the Fissian tradition.           
In any case, even if arbitrators supply reasons in their awards, they are not in a good 
position to contribute to a system of precedents, since the second condition mentioned above 
(publicity) is not met. Indeed, in the private law domain, publicity is clearly the exception. It is 
often confidentiality reasons that lead parties to prefer arbitration over adjudication.19   
                                                          
17 Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements. Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 117. 
18 Alan Scott Rau, “On Integrity in Private Judging”, 14 Arbitration International,115 (1998), p. 148. 
19 Mark Weidemaier, in “Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration”, 51 William and Mary Law Review, 
1895 (2010), p. 1921, notes that the publication of the awards is not strictly necessary: their accesibility is sufficient. 
Thus, in systems where a few arbitrators capture a large share of the arbitration business, awards can be taken into 




Nor is the third condition satisfied: arbitrators may be part of an informal network, but they 
are not organized in a hierarchical structure. There is no arbitral tribunal at the apex settling 
interpretive controversies among them.  
Should all this matter? Should we be concerned about the “precedential deficit” of the 
arbitral process? In general, the answer is no. The political community should not be anxious about 
the under-production of jurisprudential rules by arbitrators, since regular courts are intensely 
occupied with thousands of cases that raise all sorts of legal issues. Courts have enough 
controversies to produce precedents from. In almost every field, arbitration does not deprive judges 
of the necessary raw material.20 
Actually, there is a potential advantage in arbitrators adjudicating cases without the 
“burden” of contributing to a system of precedents: they may be more eager to try novel solutions 
to legal problems, since the effects of their decisions are limited to the specific controversies and 
do not bind other decision-makers. The new solutions, moreover, cannot be immediately killed by 
courts, since the standards that the latter apply when reviewing the validity of awards are typically 
quite relaxed. As a result, some breathing space is opened for arbitrators to experiment with new 
approaches to legal questions. Regular courts may actually end up embracing them. (In addition, 
of course, parties are usually allowed to ask the arbitrators to decide their cases, not in accordance 
with the law, but in light of general notions of fairness, equity and justice: ex aequo et bono).   
So arbitrators may sometimes make decisions that differ from those courts would have 
reached. This is not objectionable per se. What matters, arguably, is that the arbitral process be 
                                                          
20 A study conducted in the United States by Chistopher Drahozal, for example, concluded that “only in 
relatively limited areas does it appear that arbitration might completely remove cases from the courts”. See 




structured in the direction of justice. Arbitrators are to “seek the right, the just, and the true 
judgment”, as Fiss writes.  
Now, in light of this goal, how does the arbitral process fare, in terms of independence? 
Recall that, with respect to judges, Fiss distinguishes between party detachment, which should be 
absolute, and political insularity, which should be optimal, but not maximal. How does arbitration 
fare, if we apply this distinction?  
The first form of independence (party detachment) is structurally weaker in arbitration than 
in adjudication. Whereas the parties do not appoint the judges, they do appoint the arbitrators. Is 
there cause for concern here?  
A debate has developed, in this connection, regarding tripartite arbitral tribunals. The 
general practice is for each party to choose one arbitrator unilaterally, while the third arbitrator 
(the presiding arbitrator or chairperson) is jointly appointed by the parties, or by the two co-
arbitrators. Although the three arbitrators are normally under the legal duty to be impartial, critics 
contend that the arbitrators that are unilaterally selected are biased in favor of the party that made 
the appointment. Only the presiding arbitrator can exhibit genuine neutrality. It is true, the critics 
concede, that if a party appoints a clearly biased arbitrator, his chances of victory are reduced, 
since the chairperson will then be skeptical of that party´s case. But even if there are incentives for 
parties to avoid extreme partisanship in their appointments, the degree of objectivity of the co-
arbitrators may be too low. Those who defend the current system sometimes draw a distinction 




appointing party, but they are authorized to be “sympathetic” to the interests or views of that party. 
Critics reply that this subtle distinction is not tenable in practice.21  
Jan Paulsson, a very prominent arbitrator and professor, has joined the critics. He proposes 
to end the practice of unilateral appointments. All the arbitrators, he urges, should be jointly 
appointed by the parties. If they fail to agree, a neutral arbitral institution should then intervene.22 
The independence of arbitrators would be improved if this change were introduced. In addition, 
he argues, the professional diversity of the tribunal would be richer: arbitrators could be chosen in 
light of their complementary areas of expertise, instead of their sympathy toward the appointing 
party.23  
Actually, one may argue further along these lines and claim that it would be advisable to 
have a generalist jurist as an arbitrator, to interact with the more specialized experts. The latter 
may be prey to “cognitive loafing”: they may be reluctant to think critically about their narrow 
understandings, in light of more general principles. (Administrative agencies, for example, have 
been said to suffer from this bias).24 To the extent, moreover, that the “separability doctrine” 
empowers arbitrators to rule on the validity of the underlying contract, the arbitral tribunal should 
include a jurist with the necessary legal background in general contract law.   
                                                          
21 For a critique of this distinction, see Alan Scott Rau, “On Integrity in Private Judging”, op. cit., pp. 230-
231. 
22 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 153-166, and pp. 
276-283. 
23 Ibid., p. 280. 
24 See Mark Siedenfeld, “Cognitive loafing, social conformity, and judicial review of agency rulemaking”, 




So moving beyond unilateral appointments, as Paulsson suggests, looks like an appropriate 
step to take, from a Fissian perspective: the arbitral tribunal´s impartiality would be enhanced, and 
its epistemic capacity to track legal truth would be strengthened.  
Now, what about the other side of the coin, independence understood as political insularity? 
In his discussion of courts, Fiss insists that independence from the political branches should be 
optimal, but not maximal. In this regard, arbitrators are actually more independent than judges, 
since some of the instruments that the political institutions can use to check courts are not 
applicable against arbitrators. The political branches, in particular, have no say in the appointment 
process, and they have no control over arbitral finances. There is still the possibility, however, for 
the political branches to intervene through the law-making process. Should they?  
Insofar as arbitrators produce no case law, no democratic checks through legislation are 
really necessary. Arbitrators generally follow the law enacted by the political branches, as 
interpreted and developed by public courts. What the political branches should pay attention to, 
therefore, is the body of precedents generated by judges. Even if, as indicated earlier, arbitrators 
sometimes experiment with novel solutions to legal problems, the democratic institutions need not 
step in. They should wait and see in what directions courts elaborate their doctrines in reaction to 
arbitral developments. If courts finally embrace the new legal construction advanced by some 
arbitrators, the political bodies can then intervene through the usual legislative mechanisms.  
Of course, if arbitrators deviate from mandatory law (that is, the law that parties cannot 
contract out of, for reasons of public policy or public order), the political branches ought to be 
concerned. In this scenario, there are good reasons for courts to be authorized to quash the awards, 




here, is how deferentially judges should review the awards. The answer, arguably, is contextual. 
We should bear in mind that both arbitration and adjudication are imperfect institutions. The 
standards of review to be used by courts should be based on a comparative institutional analysis. 
What kind of procedure arbitrators have followed, for example, is relevant for purposes of the 
judicial assessment of the decision they have arrived at.25  
It bears emphasizing that the division of labor between arbitrators and judges I have just 
described is basically the same, whether the disputes to be resolved are purely domestic, or whether 
they are instead connected to an international transaction. Indeed, international commercial 
arbitration is “international” only in the sense that the transaction or the dispute is connected to 
two or more countries. But the parties usually select the substantive law of a particular country to 
govern the contract. It is too risky to subject the contract to vague principles of international lex 
mercatoria. The more developed and mature body of law that states have produced offers better 
protection to the parties.26 As a result, arbitrators that deal with international transactions are 
normally asked to apply the set of laws enacted by a given political community.       
In sum, within the sphere of private law, arbitrators cannot be expected to generate 
precedents. There is no reason to be worried about this deficit, however. Their degree of 
independence, in terms of party detachment, may need to be enhanced, but their high level of 
political insularity is not objectionable.  
 
                                                          
25 Daniel Markovits has argued, in this connection, that if the role of arbitrators is simply to fill the gaps of 
a contract, any procedure chosen by the parties will do. If, in contrast, arbitrators are asked to perform an 
adjudicative function that covers non-waivable statutory rights, certain procedural guarantees must then be observed. 
See “Arbitration´s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Contract”, 59 DePaul Law Review, 
431 (2009-2010), pp. 469-487. 




ARBITRATION, PRECEDENTS, AND DEMOCRATIC CHECKS IN THE SPHERE OF 
INVESTMENT LAW 
The picture changes significantly, however, in the field of investor/state arbitration. Here 
we encounter no parliament or regulatory body in charge of producing specific rules. The law in 
the investment domain consists of international treaties and customary norms that typically 
embody very open-ended principles (such as the “fair and equitable treatment” standard). The 
thousands of treaties that have been adopted usually incorporate the same abstract principles. This 
has the advantage of generating “network effects”. As Santiago Montt has explained, states benefit 
from the economies of scale that derive from a global regime based on treaties that use the same 
substantive terms. The first treaty is an esoteric document that nobody knows how it will work. As 
more treaties are signed, the practice under one treaty has repercussions on the general practice.27  
There is no permanent judiciary, however, that can generate the necessary case law to 
specify the meaning of the abstract principles that protect foreign investors. The International 
Court of Justice, in particular, cannot be counted on for these purposes, given its very marginal 
role in this area. Arbitration, therefore, has become the center of gravity in the field. There is 
pressure for arbitrators to understand their role to include the production of legal doctrines, since 
there is a vacuum to be filled. Indeed, most of the arbitral awards are published. They are always 
reasoned. And they are regularly taken into account by arbitrators in other cases. A system of 
precedent has gradually emerged, but it is a weak one, since no central arbitral tribunal has been 
set up to unify the interpretation of the law. 28   
                                                          
27 Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), p. 109. 
28 See Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler, “Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?”, 23 Arbitration 




It would seem that any step to strengthen the capacity of the arbitral process to generate 
precedents in this domain should be welcome. But here we face a problem. The current arbitral 
regime has been criticized on the ground that it is partial to investors. The objection has been 
advanced, in particular, that ICSID arbitrators are interpreting and applying the abstract principles 
that protect investors in ways that are too friendly to the latter. As a consequence, the capacity of 
democratic governments to regulate matters in the public interest (to protect the environment, for 
example) is reduced in an unjustified manner. To support the objection, some scholars have 
pointed out that the generous doctrines espoused by arbitrators are the fruits of an institutional 
structure that is biased in favor of investors. Arbitrators, it is contended, are interested in making 
ICSID an attractive arbitration forum. The more cases that are brought to it, the more business and 
money arbitrators will get. Since, in practice, investors are the claimants, they must be treated well 
by arbitrators. In contrast, judges are more likely to be balanced in their interpretation of the law, 
since their future salaries do not depend on who wins a case.29   
From a Fissian perspective (which is strongly committed to judicial independence, 
understood as party detachment), this objection, if correct, would be fatal to the legitimacy of the 
existing arbitral regime. There are reasons to cast some doubts on the objection, however. First, it 
is true that arbitrators have an incentive to make arbitration attractive to investors. But they also 
have a counter-incentive not to make states upset about the system, which is relatively fragile. 
States are still powerful actors in the international regime. Second, the general practice is that only 
one of the arbitrators is appointed by the investor. The other is chosen by the state that is a party 
to the dispute, while the third arbitrator has to be agreed upon. So arbitrators cannot be very hostile 
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to state interests, if they want to maintain or enhance their chances of being hired in the future. (A 
similar balance would obtain if all arbitrators were jointly appointed by the state and the investor). 
Third, the available evidence indicates that investors are not successful in a large percentage of 
cases, and that the amount of damages they are awarded when they win is often much lower than 
they had originally claimed.30  
This does not mean that there is no room for improving the doctrinal approaches that 
arbitrators follow. Thus, a more sophisticated articulation of the standards of review to be applied 
when assessing the validity of different governmental measures may be necessary.31 And a higher 
sensitivity to the constitutional and administrative law of advanced legal systems is to be urged.32 
But the criticism based on a theory of structural bias seems to be a weak one. 
 Let us now turn to the other aspect of independence, political insularity. In light of Owen 
Fiss´s theory, arbitral independence should be compatible with the existence of mechanisms that 
the political branches can use to influence or reorient the body of case law that arbitrators (however 
imperfectly) generate. What avenues are open for the democratic institutions to express their inputs 
in the interpretive process? There are two possibilities we should explore here. 
a) State-to-state arbitration 
A first possibility, which is very underdeveloped in practice, is for the democratic 
governments to express their points of view in state-to-state arbitration procedures, which are 
detached from the specific controversies that may arise between the investors and those 
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governments.33 Thus, two states that enter an investment treaty may agree to include a clause that 
remits to arbitration any interpretive dispute they may have in the future with regard to the treaty. 
If an arbitration tribunal is asked to intervene, it will issue an abstract ruling on the provisions that 
have triggered the disagreement between the states. The decision rendered in this process is then 
binding on the arbitrators that have to handle specific disputes between investors and governments.  
State-to-state arbitration is potentially useful, not only to clarify the interpretation of the 
treaty as a response to the contradictory views of different arbitrators in specific cases, but also in 
order to cabin the more coherent doctrines the latter may have created. Presumably, the tribunal 
that adjudicates the state-to-state interpretive dispute will fix an interpretation of the treaty that is 
within the range of readings advanced by the two states.  
A critical feature to highlight here is that state-to-state arbitration is an “abstract” procedure 
that is not linked to particular cases. Abstraction brings with it several advantages.34 Consistency 
in the application of the law is one of them. The tribunal dealing with the abstract procedure is 
asked to lay down a general rule that will bind arbitrators in future cases. Investors are thus ensured 
equal treatment (no matter their nationality).  
In addition to consistency, abstraction generates a higher level of objectivity. The tribunal 
asked to rule in the abstract does not know how exactly its holding will favor or disfavor particular 
investors or particular states in specific controversies that will erupt in the future –under a 
relatively stable treaty. When interpreting the treaty, the tribunal may be more or less friendly to 
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states as a class, or to investors as a class, but not to a specific state in one case, or to a specific 
company in another. Abstraction is a veil of ignorance technique. It is true, of course, that the 
tribunal may be asked to rule on a question that is relevant for a pending case. In order to reinforce 
objectivity, the ruling should have prospective effects only.35   
Abstraction is also linked to a systematic approach to legal problems. As Owen Fiss has 
argued in the constitutional context, courts should take into account the interests of the many 
people who are affected by a judgment –not only those of litigants. With reference to welfare 
rights, Fiss has written:  
“Because it lays down a rule for a nation and invokes the authority of the Constitution, the 
Court necessarily must concern itself with the fate of millions of people, all of whom touch the 
welfare system in a myriad of ways: some on welfare, some wanting welfare, some being denied 
welfare, some dispensing welfare, some creating and administering welfare, some paying for it. 
Accordingly the Court´s perspective must be systematic, not anecdotal: The Court should focus 
not on the plight of four or five or even twenty families but should consider the welfare system as 
a whole –a complex network embracing millions of people and a host of bureaucratic and political 
institutions”.36 
Similar problems may arise in the investment domain. Suppose an investor argues that the 
restriction imposed by the government on his property rights, in order to protect the environment, 
was not justified, since the state could have acted differently to reach its goals. Other investors 
make the same argument. Suppose, however, that the state could have acted differently in a handful 
of cases only, but not in all the cases altogether, for it lacks the necessary resources. A systematic 
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look at the problem, through an abstract procedure, should be welcome. The accumulation of 
unconnected judgments rendered in different specific cases may lead to a suboptimal outcome.37  
There is yet another advantage to a system that includes an abstract procedure of the kind 
we are examining. The types of experts that are selected to decide the abstract interpretive question 
may be different from those charged with the task of deciding particular disputes between investors 
and governments. A concrete controversy involving the construction of a bridge, for example, may 
call for experts that are familiar with certain factual complexities that are not present when an 
interpretive issue is framed in the abstract. Or, as Anthea Roberts argues, the kind of interpretive 
problems that the treaty poses may be more easily dealt with by experts in public international law, 
whereas the interpretive issues that arise in a specific dispute may be more appropriately tackled 
by jurists with a strong background in commercial law.38    
b) Treaty amendments, interpretive notes, and new treaties 
States may intervene in the interpretive process in a more direct way: they may elect to 
amend the relevant treaty, to specify what they meant by the textual provisions they had originally 
written. As masters of the treaties, states can make the necessary modifications to clarify their will, 
if they disagree with the content the arbitrators have ascribed to the original terms.  
An alternative, less cumbersome possibility is this: some treaties provide for the 
establishment of a commission, made up of representatives of the states, which is granted the 
power to issue interpretive notes on the relevant treaty. Such notes are binding on arbitrators.39  
                                                          
37 Anthea Roberts, “State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration”, op. cit, p. 56, footnote 308.  
38 Ibid., pp. 51-54. 
39 The Free Trade Commission under NAFTA is a prominent example. See NAFTA, article 1131. On July 
31, 2001, the Commission issued an interpretive note that “responded” to the interpretation reached by arbitrators in 




These two possibilities, of course, require the consent of the parties to the treaty. In 
multiparty treaties, it is not easy for all the states to come to an agreement concerning the way in 
which the abstract principles they wrote in the treaty should be read and implemented.  
What is easier is for states to express their views in new treaties, when the earlier ones 
come to an end, thus helping define new legal trends. An interesting development has taken place 
in this connection. In the past, powerful capital-exporting nations tended to press weaker capital-
importing countries to ratify international treaties that were very protective of investors. At present, 
however, the contrast between the two groups of states is less stark. More often than was the case 
in the past, states find themselves in a dual position: they are both exporters and importers of 
capital. While they are interested in protecting their nationals when the latter invest abroad, they 
are also interested in safeguarding their governmental capacity to regulate matters in the public 
interest when they receive investments from foreigners. This has led to a more balanced regulation 
of investment guarantees in the new treaties. (The evolution in the United States, concerning its 
Model BIT, is very revealing. The 2004 and 2012 Models are more nuanced than the earlier 1987 
Model).40 So while states cannot easily change the existing treaties, they can make new ones, and 
gradually replace the old ones when they expire.  
There are thus different possibilities for states to cabin the interpretive powers of 
arbitrators, or to move the law forward in new directions.  
The main problem we face, however, is that the governments that represent the states enter 
this international scenario wearing two hats. Sometimes they wear the hat of a litigant, when they 
get involved in a dispute with an investor. Other times, they wear the democratic hat, when they 
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express the will of the citizens at the national level and bring this will to a wider collective 
conversation at the international level. This dual role generates a deep tension in the system.  
On the one hand, to the extent governments are parties to disputes, the system wants to 
protect the independence of arbitrators. One of the advantages of investment arbitration in its 
current form is that a dispute between an investor and its host state need not harm the political 
relationships between the latter and the home state. The home state is not expected to get involved 
in the procedure to support the investor.41 The less politicized the arbitral atmosphere, the better.   
On the other hand, it is desirable to subject arbitrators to some democratic constraints. As 
Owen Fiss argues about courts, we should not want them to enjoy maximal political insularity.  
But one of the salient features of the world we inhabit is that there is no political community at the 
global level that can control international tribunals. There is no “demos” there. In the context of 
his discussion of international courts that deal with human rights violations, Fiss has observed that 
there are no democratic institutions to which such courts must answer. 42  “There may be 
mechanisms to hold them accountable, but not to a demos”.43 In the absence of a genuine political 
community on the international plane, it is basically the governments of the different states that 
can express democratic inputs.  
So the dual character of governments (as litigants and as democratic voices) generates a 
systemic friction that cannot be easily eliminated. The various mechanisms for checking the 
performance of arbitrators will always operate on a shaky ground, until the conditions that 
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characterize the political structure of our world undergo a deep transformation in a supranational 
direction.  
 
A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS AND THE NEUTRAL FORUM ARGUMENT 
A final theme in Owen Fiss´s work that I want to explore in connection with arbitration is 
the role of courts in protecting foreign citizens. In his essay “The Immigrant as Pariah”, Fiss 
focuses on immigrants, but what he says is of wider relevance.44 
Fiss argues that foreigners are protected under the American Constitution, since the 
principle of equality that the Fourteenth Amendment announces extends to all persons, not only 
citizens.45 Given this egalitarian principle, which Fiss reads in light of his theory against group 
subordination, the government cannot impose social disabilities on immigrants, even if they have 
entered the country illegally. The power to exclude foreigners at the borders does not entail the 
power to subordinate those who have managed to cross them. Fiss accepts that some differences 
between citizens and foreigners are justified -aliens can be denied the right to vote, for instance. 
But individuals cannot be deprived of the social and economic rights that are necessary in order 
for them not to be turned into pariahs.  
Because of their political vulnerability, Fiss argues, immigrants need the help of courts. 
Indeed, the judiciary must “scrutinize with a healthy measure of skepticism the work of the elected 
bodies insofar as it affects immigrants”.46 Fiss admits that there is no guarantee that the courts will 
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carry out this task well enough. They may fail in a number of ways. But he thinks we have some 
grounds for hoping that they will make a difference. 
Now, it is interesting to note that one of the standard justifications for international 
arbitration is the “neutral forum” argument. According to this argument, when private parties of 
different nationalities enter a transaction, they have good reason to attach an arbitration clause to 
the contract, in order to escape from the jurisdiction of domestic courts. It is reasonable for them 
to fear that such courts will be biased in favor of local parties. Gary Born, for example, writes in 
his influential treatise: “One of the central objectives of international arbitration agreements is to 
provide a neutral forum for dispute resolution”. Domestic courts are distrusted: “If nothing else, 
an instinctive mistrust of the potential for home-court bias usually prompts parties to refuse to 
agree to litigate in their counter-party´s local courts”.47 Similarly, Jan Paulsson explains that “it is 
unusual for parties of different nationalities to agree to the jurisdiction of a national court”. “Either 
party is disinclined to accept the courts of the other”.48 As a result, arbitrability (that is, the range 
of matters that the law allows private parties to submit to arbitration) is often deemed especially 
broad in connection with international business transactions, “where it is important to avoid 
nationalistic turf wars”. 49  Actually, Jan Paulsson suggests that arbitration agreements should 
include the requirement that no arbitrator may have the nationality of any party.50 
Arbitration, of course, cannot dispense with local courts entirely. The danger of favoritism 
is therefore still present. When a foreign award needs to be enforced by domestic courts, for 
example, the New York Convention permits the latter to deny enforcement on “public policy” 
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grounds. The risk exists that judges will apply this vague standard in an arbitrary manner, to favor 
the local party. Public policy exceptions may thus serve as a cover for “xenophobic bias”.51     
Note that the neutral forum argument does not say that the courts in some countries are 
corrupt. Corruption may actually help foreigners, if they are wealthier than the local parties and 
are willing to offer bribes. Nor does the argument claim that courts are incompetent to handle cases 
properly. The argument is more troubling: because of national prejudices, domestic judges are not 
reliable enough when they are asked to decide a dispute involving a local and a foreigner.  
The contrast between Fiss´s expectation that courts can perform a key role in pursuing 
justice for foreigners, on the one hand, and the neutral forum argument that figures so prominently 
in the current justification for international arbitration, on the other, is a stark one. The two 
intuitions cannot be embraced at the same time. They are in obvious tension. 
Now, let us assume that the neutrality argument in favor of arbitration is basically correct. 
That is, let us assume that there is indeed a significant danger of local favoritism on the part of the 
domestic judiciary. This assumption should force us to launch a more ambitious critique of the 
current legal structures. If, indeed, national courts have a propensity to favor the locals, we should 
acknowledge that the level of civilization we have reached through the law is not very high. What 
should be done?  
We can distinguish two basic strategies to confront this problem. The first strategy, which 
we may call “external”, seeks to create decision-making institutions that are removed from the 
local players. Arbitration in the international business sphere would be an example of such a 
strategy. But arbitration, of course, is only a fragmentary solution to the neutrality problem, since 
                                                          




it only covers contractual disputes. Arbitration does not apply to many controversies involving 
citizens of diverse nationalities. If, for example, a local pedestrian suffers injuries caused by a 
foreign driver, the action for damages will be decided by domestic courts. (It is extremely rare for 
arbitration to be resorted to after the controversy arises). With respect to criminal law, local courts 
will be in charge, since criminal law cannot be arbitrated. The same is true of many other branches 
of the law.  
We should therefore consider the possibility of creating “international courts” to decide 
matters that cannot be arbitrated. Much in the same way that, in the United States, federal courts 
have jurisdiction to decide controversies between citizens of different states, it may be advisable 
to establish a new set of international courts to decide controversies that confront individuals of 
different nationalities.  
Alternatively, we may want to leave matters in the hands of domestic courts, but put them 
under the supervision of a supranational court that is made up of judges of different nationalities. 
Within the framework of the European Union, for example, the prejudice against foreigners is in 
part counter-acted by European Union law, which protects the principle of no discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. This principle is to be observed by local courts, but there is a more “neutral” 
tribunal, the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, made up of judges of the different 28 
member states, that has some capacity to guide such courts into an objective legal outcome.  
 It is important to notice that, in the field of public international law, progress has usually 
been associated with the establishment of tribunals whose structure and composition is such that 
national preferences can be transcended.52 We should recall, in this regard, the powerful arguments 
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made by Hans Kelsen in favor of a truly impartial International Court of Justice. He was against 
the idea that judges of the nationality of the states that are parties to a controversy should 
participate in the decision. He was thus critical of the institution of “ad hoc” judges. He even 
proposed that the judges of the Court should have their nationality suspended for the duration of 
their term. They were to be given an international passport, as officers of the international 
community.53 The International Court of Justice that was finally set up in 1945 was not patterned 
after this Kelsenian model, but this is usually regarded as the unfortunate upshot of the need to 
accommodate the power of the states.   
A completely different approach to attack the problem of national bias is “internal”: it seeks 
to transform the attitudes and beliefs that lead to local prejudices. Instead of looking for external 
institutions to realize impartiality, the plan is to introduce the necessary internal changes in order 
to push national institutions in the direction of impartiality. The idea is that citizens should be 
educated into the belief that all human beings have an equal moral standing and should therefore 
be treated equally under the law. Legislatures should be sensitive to this basic moral equality, even 
if distinctions between locals and foreigners may sometimes be justified. And judges and juries 
should be taught and urged to be impartial when they interpret and administer the law in specific 
disputes. The fact that one of the parties to the controversy comes from another country is to be 
made completely irrelevant when the law needs to be applied.  
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that until the XIXth century, “mixed juries”, made 
up of natives and aliens, were used in Great Britain to try cases involving a national and a 
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foreigner.54 This institution was finally abolished in 1870, in part because of the difficulty in 
finding foreign juries, and in part because no reason was thought to exist to question the capacity 
of British people to act in a fair and open-minded manner. As the Earl of Derby said during the 
legislative debates at the House of Lords, “it seems to me (…) that it is stigmatizing ourselves as 
a nation very unjustly to assume that the prejudice against foreigners is such that an alien on his 
trial will not have a fair trial before British subjects”.55  
An interesting question is whether it is possible to follow the external and the internal 
strategies at the same time. They may actually be in tension. The more we insist on external 
tribunals, made up of judges or arbitrators that have a different nationality than that of the parties 
to a dispute, the more we reinforce the expectation that national bias is inevitable at the domestic 
level. 
What is Fiss to say about all this? It is clear that he takes impartiality in the application of 
the law to be a cardinal virtue of any decent legal system. “Law requires impersonality, so that the 
applicability of norms does not turn on the personal identity of the subject”, he writes, when 
discussing the role of judges in protecting individuals in the context of the war against terrorism.56 
I am inclined to say that Fiss will urge us to concentrate our collective energy on the internal 
strategy. The external strategy should be pursued with caution, in ways that are least harmful to 
the internal transformative project.  
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It is true that Fiss has insisted on the relevance of groups, in the framework of his theory 
on equality.57 But this does to mean that he espouses the view that groups have a distinctive identity 
that shapes the moral values of its members. As Anthony Kronman argues, the ultimate goal that 
Fiss seeks to achieve is the liberation of the individual, even if he insists, instrumentally, on the 
need to work out remedies that are sensitive to the social structures that subordinate groups. The 
individual to be liberated, moreover, is not a person that is expected to strive for the satisfaction 
of his or her own narrow interests, but someone who is capable of yielding to the higher authority 
of norms.58  
Given this moral background, I think Owen Fiss will be reluctant to endorse the assumption 
that, in order for national prejudices to be transcended, the principal solution is to rely on external, 
supra-national, institutions. I expect him to favor a reconfiguration of society along cosmopolitan, 
non-nationalistic lines. The political community should work itself pure through its own laws and 
courts. 
Many of you will be quick to point out that this program of deep, internal transformation 
encounters lots of obstacles in practice. You may be right. But remember that Owen Fiss is well-
known for his deliciously heroic optimism. “Never give up”, he will always tell us. 
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